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Abstract
Many of the fundamental inventions of genome editing, including meganu-
cleases, zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs), transcription activator-like effector
nucleases (TALENs), and CRISPR, were first made at universities and
patented to encourage commercial development. This gave rise to a diver-
sity of technology transfer models but also conflicts among them. Against
a broader historical and policy backdrop of university patenting and spe-
cial challenges concerning research tools, we review the patent estates of
genome editing and the diversity of technology transfer models employed
to commercialize them, including deposit in the public domain, open access
contracts, material transfer agreements, nonexclusive and exclusive licenses,
surrogate licenses, and aggregated licenses. Advantages are found in this di-
versity, allowing experimentation and competition that we characterize as a
federalism model of technology transfer. A notable feature of genome edit-
ing has been the rise and success of third-party licensing intermediaries. At
the same time, the rapid pace of development of genome-editing technology
is likely to erode the importance of patent estates and licensing regimes and
































































































Genome editing is one of the most revolutionary breakthroughs in biotechnology: a versatile set
of techniques that are equal parts research tool, technology platform, and molecular therapy (9).
As the name suggests, the technology allows researchers to edit the genome of a living cell at
any specific location within the larger genome by precisely cleaving the DNA at that location
and exploiting the cell’s natural DNA repair mechanisms to delete or insert DNA at the cleav-
age site (27, 42, 67). Researchers have also expanded the uses of genome-editing systems to edit
RNA, regulate gene expression, and change single nucleotides (30, 44, 106). While genome edit-
ing, broadly speaking, encompasses several technologies, the precision, ease, and flexibility of one
recently developed technique,CRISPR (an abbreviation for “clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats”), have led one of its progenitors to describe it as the “Holy Grail of genome
editing” (43).
Many of these genome-editing technologies were originally developed at universities with an
eye toward multiple possible uses, including use as a research tool; use in industrial biotechnology;
use in livestock or crops; and, especially, use in human therapies (28, 34).This hasmade technology
transfer for genome editing a complex affair, with universities and research institutions employing
a panoply of strategies for commercializing genome editing. Some of these strategies include ma-
terial transfer agreements (MTAs), controlling access to important data and methods, and the use
of nonprofit, third-party intermediaries (18, 68, 117). And, as is to be expected, they also include
the formal acquisition and licensing of traditional intellectual property (IP) rights—particularly
patents (34, 85).
Many genome-editing inventions have been and are continuing to be patented (34, 85). These
include not only the first genome-editing tools,meganucleases,which were elucidated in the 1990s
and 2000s (26), but also zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs), transcription activator-like effector nucle-
ases (TALENs), and CRISPR, not to mention vectors for all of the above (10, 18, 26, 115, 121).
Patent landscapes for these technologies are global and varied, held by researchers hailing from
many different types of research institutions and companies around the world (34, 85). The range
of technologies and, consequently, the future patent landscapes in this area are expected to con-
tinue to diversify (119).
Across this array of genome-editing technologies, patents have been involved in several dis-
putes, including among academic research institutions. Patents over meganucleases originally li-
censed from Duke University and the Pasteur Institute were disputed for years (77). Academic
institutions’ licensing practices for ZFNs sparked controversy (18, 117). And several of the core
patents over CRISPR/Cas9 have been involved in a dispute between the Broad Institute and the
University of California, Berkeley (119). As a consequence, a policy debate has grown regarding
best practices for licensing genome-editing technologies (28, 34, 39, 68).
This is, of course, not the first time that revolutionary biotechnologies have experienced
friction surrounding their patent-licensing practices. The Bayh–Dole Act—the 1980 law that
streamlined rules for institutions to take title to patents on inventions resulting from federally
funded research—was enacted contemporaneously with the rise of research on recombinant DNA
(120). This law greatly expanded university technology transfer, giving rise to offices dedicated to
the practice at many universities that did not have them before. It also led to the intensification of
the practice at those universities that were already actively engaged in licensing their technologies
(36). In subsequent years, the rapid development of biotechnology and increased sophistication
of technology transfer offices led to several controversies surrounding research institutions’
patent-licensing practices (47, 101).While many of these controversies have since subsided, if not
been entirely resolved, this has not led to research institutions adopting and adhering to a single
standard of best practices.





























































































To the contrary: As molecular biology has developed and grown more complex, so too has
the diversity of approaches to technology transfer. Today, many technology transfer and patent-
licensing strategies are available and being used for genome editing, including surrogate licensing,
which entails the employment of a for-profit surrogate to sublicense a technology on behalf of a
university (28); direct and indirect exclusive licenses to other commercially minded entities (77);
direct nonexclusive licenses doled out to multiple parties (102, 136); open licenses and research
MTAs, which are available to all comers whomeet certain criteria, such as nonprofit status or non-
commercial research and development (69); auctions of licenses (84); and IP-free models, where
the originating researchers essentially dedicate all of their work to the public domain (105). Impor-
tantly, not all of these models are mutually exclusive. Depending on the specific genome-editing
technology and application, research institutions may—and do—pick and choose among these
models in an effort to best transfer that technology to market applications (28). This makes sense:
Given the breadth of genome editing, one size does not fit all. Yet the choice of technology trans-
fer models used by research institutions has a lasting impact on how the technology is developed
and utilized.
This diversity in technology transfer models for genome editing has several implications for
the future of biotechnology licensing practices. First, there is an imperfect trade-off between the
virtues and vices of a multifaceted approach to licensing: It allows institutions to experiment with
and tailor competing models, which variously narrows or expands the scope of exclusivity for each
application. We characterize this below as a federalism model of technology transfer. Second, it
shows how rapidly developing areas of biotechnology, such as genome editing,may outpace licens-
ing practices, with new applications of CRISPR outside the scope of legacy patent estates being
a prime example (119). And third, it suggests the future significance of some licensing practices
without perfect historical antecedents—such as nonprofit, third-party intermediaries (69). This
article explores the history of these developments in technology transfer, reviews the landscape of
patent estates for genome editing, describes the current licensing models and technology trans-
fer approaches as applied to genome-editing technologies, and discusses the implications of these
models before suggesting areas for future research.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MODELS THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Technology Transfer Models Before Bayh–Dole
Historically, the patenting of inventions made at universities was influenced at least as much by
the norms of science as by formal public policy (75). While the frontiers of science have often
stretched well beyond the scope of patentable subject matter, in both the United States and Eu-
rope, professors doing research within patentable subject matters would occasionally apply for
patents as individuals. For example, William Thomson (known more famously as Lord Kelvin),
a professor, dean, and then chancellor at the University of Glasgow from 1846 through 1907,
patented more than 70 inventions covering a wide range of instruments and measurement devices
in his own name (132). In other cases, professors working in close collaboration with industry
partners often followed the norms of industry consultancy or internships and directly assigned in-
ventions to their industry partners. Fritz Haber, a professor of physical chemistry at the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology, patented his 1909 invention of a high-pressure, scalable nitrogen fixation
technique to produce ammonia and then assigned it to BASF (54), where he was collaborating
with Carl Bosch, resulting in the enormously impactful Haber–Bosch process that remains the
mainstay of fertilizer production to this day (124). In German-speaking and Scandinavian coun-
tries, public policies emerged by the mid-twentieth century to enshrine the so-called professor’s
exemption—deviating from standard laws of employees being “hired to invent”—such that that
professors were not obligated to assign patent rights to their university employers (72).





























































































The modern proliferation of university patenting and licensing is often considered to begin,
at least in the United States, with the 1980 Bayh–Dole Act and the lesser-known but also im-
portant Stevenson–Wydler Act, both of which streamlined rules allowing research institutions to
take assignment of patents on inventions created with federal research funds (36). Yet the main
models of university technology transfer emerged long before 1980 (91, 92, 101, 120). The prac-
tice arguably derived from the pragmatic norms and decentralized governance structures of the
land-grant university system in the United States, where results of research were more likely to
be useful in commercial applications, to fulfill regional economic development objectives, and to
fall within the legal scope of patentable subject matter (112).
In the first decades of the twentieth century, several pioneering US land-grant university in-
ventors influenced the development of three basic approaches to university patent management,
which were taken up at leading universities by the 1930s and still largely define the organizational
structures of university technology transfer today (126). The first arrangement was the Research
Corporation, established in 1912 as a licensing organization to manage patents on the “cleantech”
electrostatic precipitation inventions made by Frederick Cottrell at the University of California,
the first of which was filed in 1906 (29). The Research Corporation was an independent entity
that managed patents as a service and later expanded to manage inventions arising beyond the
University of California, effectively establishing its business model as a third-party technology
licensing agency. By the 1970s, it was serving hundreds of research universities (91).
The second arrangement was the internal management of patents by the university
administration—often in the office of the university general counsel—as was done at the Univer-
sity of California for the 1915 invention by T. Brailsford Robertson of tethelin, a pharmaceutical
pituitary extract (111). This model was replicated at the University of Minnesota for the 1916
invention by Edward Kendall of a pharmaceutical thyroid extract at the Mayo Clinic (71, 142).
The third arrangement—a sort of compromise between the previous two models—was a
university-affiliated research foundation, beginning with the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foun-
dation (WARF), founded in 1925 by several wealthy alumni of the University of Wisconsin to
manage the invention by professor Harry Steenbock of vitamin D fortification of foods through
irradiation (2, 127). Most significantly, these developments established the principle that an in-
vention could be patented and assigned to the academic institution as a credible, if controversial,
practice within the scientific community (103).
Technology Transfer from Cohen–Boyer to Bayh–Dole
During the decade prior to the Bayh–Dole Act, Stanley N. Cohen and Herbert W. Boyer of
Stanford University and the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), respectively, filed
for patents on their breakthrough in the use of restriction enzymes to genetically engineer bacte-
ria.The Cohen–Boyer invention has perhaps been the single piece of technologymost responsible
for establishing precedent concerning the licensing of biotechnology research tools by academic
institutions (63). That precedent, a licensing program developed by Niels Reimers at Stanford
University, centered on broad and nonexclusive licensing, recognizing the political sensitivities of
the universities seeking patent protection over, essentially, techniques for doing research (110).
Over the life of the technology’s licensing program, the Cohen–Boyer patents were licensed to
more than 450 companies, enabled more than 2,400 new products with more than $35 billion in
product sales, and brought more than $250 million in royalties to Stanford and UCSF (40).
Only 10 days after the first of the Cohen–Boyer patents were issued by the US Patent and
TrademarkOffice, President JimmyCarter signed the Bayh–Dole Act into law, uniformly allowing
inventions created with federal funding to be assigned to the universities where they were created





























































































(120). The act’s objective was to encourage commercial development of the results of federally
funded research—not, as has become a common misconception, to simply allow universities to
collect royalty income based on their researchers’ successes (36).
The actual changes in federal policy that the Bayh–Dole Act introduced were relatively
minor—essentially, a harmonization of federal agencies’ rules for federal contractors to patent
inventions made while working under a federal contract, and a clarification that universities, as
contractors, could take title to inventions that occurred under federal research grants (101). But
the legislation effected a paradigmatic if not cultural shift among research institutions, spawning
a wave of technology transfer offices at hundreds of universities in the United States (104).
Whether this shift was the result of Bayh–Dole or other factors is, even today, not entirely
clear (91). The expectations set by the Cohen–Boyer royalties and similar successes by a handful
of other major university inventions may have influenced university administrators who saw that
patent royalties could become a significant source of discretionary revenue. And this attraction
persists even though the preponderance of evidence continues to suggest that only a very small
number of exceptional inventions yield such returns (114). Today, most universities’ patent port-
folios do not earn positive net returns from licensing in the long run (16). Whether technology
transfer will come to be seen as a service for faculty—even if not profitable—or as a mechanism
to encourage more engaged research remains to be seen. But efforts in the area have led to robust
experimentation, some of which has resulted in missteps and course corrections along the way.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MODELS FOR RESEARCH TOOLS: CASES
AND CONTROVERSIES
While the Bayh–Dole Act focused on using patents to move university research into commerce,
the increased tendency of patenting research tools presented several challenges. By their very
nature, research tools, such as methods, biological materials, reagents, equipment, software, and
databases, are often developed in academic laboratories in response to the needs of ongoing re-
search. Their value lies in reducing the costs or increasing the feasibility of future research and
innovation in both academia and industry (100).
The patenting of research tools consequently presents two main complications. First, a given
invention can have a dual nature, being useful both upstream as a research tool and downstream as
a component of a commercial product or process. For its upstream uses, it is socially optimal for
a technology to be made broadly and widely available—at merely the marginal cost of production
and distribution of the tool—since proprietary or strategic withholding of research tools can slow
innovation rates or distort the direction of research and development across the entire economy
(140). For downstream commercial applications, exclusivity in the marketplace or royalties from
other users can be crucial in ensuring that returns can cover the fixed investments required. Yet
the extent and nature of these possible downstream applications may be highly speculative and
uncertain at the time of the invention in an academic setting, complicating licensing practices
(96). This gives rise to the challenge of managing the IP to allow for relative nonexclusivity for
upstream uses, while also allowing for eventual exclusivity for downstream uses—if and when
needed to incentivize product development.
The second complication, especially in new fields of technology, arises from patents cover-
ing research tools that often end up being excessive in scope—both broader than what was in-
vented and broader than needed to further develop the technology through licensing. Some of
this breadth stems from patent law doctrines and economic incentives that encourage applicants
to claim the full scope of a new tool they have created in the early days of a new technology, even
while patent examiners have only limited prior art to assess such applications. The messy dual





























































































nature of research tools and the problem of overly broad claims have been particularly salient for
biotechnologies, which have long posed challenges for both patent law and university technology
transfer policy. The realization of commercial opportunities created by new research tools has—
aside from the broad, nonexclusive licensing practices demonstrated in the Cohen–Boyer case—
depended on three different regimes in varying combinations: exclusive licensing, MTAs, and IP-
free or public-domain models. Examples of each of these models—and their controversies—have
informed the emergence of normative values concerning technology transfer practices among re-
search institutions. We review cases from each of these models below.
Exclusive Licenses
Individual genes—their sequences and functions—are a canonical example of a dual-nature
biotechnology research tool, both a means to further research and an integral component of com-
mercial products. Genes have been the subject of patents and exclusive licenses under the auspices
of government-sponsored research (120). As they began to proliferate in the 1990s with improve-
ments in sequencing, exclusively licensed gene patents were viewed as counterproductive to the
very research being promoted by the government (37, 45, 61).
One set of such patents, pertaining to the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, originated at the Univer-
sity of Utah and were licensed exclusively to Myriad Genetics, which managed them in a manner
that caused significant controversy (120). The patents were eventually challenged by a coalition
of other researchers and patient advocacy organizations in a case that wound its way to the US
Supreme Court. In its 2013 decision, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (6), the
SupremeCourt disallowed composition-of-matter claims to isolatedDNAmolecules that had nat-
urally occurring sequences. The opinion homed in on “the considerable danger that the grant of
patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation premised upon
them”’ (6, p. 589). An empirical analysis looked at how many US patents had claims of the sort
that were invalidated by theMyriad decision and found that academic and government assignees
accounted for fully a third of such patents, with the University of California, the University of
Washington, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Texas, and the US National Institutes
of Health (NIH) among the top assignees of such research-tool gene patents (48).
The patents on methods for deriving human embryonic stem cells and the resulting cell lines,
which were granted in 1998 to the University of Wisconsin andWARF (131), posed a more com-
plex set of challenges (139). Federal funding for embryonic stem cell research had been long con-
tested due to its reliance on the destruction of fertilized human embryos. Thus, it was largely
a private firm, Geron, that sponsored the research leading to the invention. WARF granted an
exclusive commercial license to Geron for therapeutic applications of human embryonic stem
cells. Then, after federal funding was further curtailed under the Bush administration in 2000, a
few state-level initiatives were set up to finance stem cell research, the most significant being the
California Institute of Regenerative Medicine (CIRM). In a resource-poor environment, WARF
sought to require commercial licenses from companies, even when the companies sponsored stem
cell research at academic and nonprofit institutions. Under this approach, WARF sought to es-
tablish a royalty-bearing license from CIRM for CIRM-funded research at California universities
and research institutions. And, beginning in 2006, WARF also sought royalties for the deriva-
tion and use of induced pluripotent stem cell lines, which emerged as a competing technology
from discoveries at the University of Kyoto, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
and elsewhere. After pressure and criticism mounted, including a reexamination of the underlying
patents in 2006, WARF relaxed these positions (53). Still, it was WARF’s original sponsor and
exclusive licensee, Geron, that in 2009 initiated first-in-human phase 1 clinical trials of a therapy





























































































based on human embryonic stem cells (20). Some of the original patents have since expired; given
the paucity of approved human stem cell therapies, it is unclear whether the cost of such licenses
ultimately hindered the technology’s potential or other technical, regulatory, or ethical factors are
what held it back.
In some extreme cases—and contrary to the objectives of the Bayh–Dole Act—universities have
sought to assert research-tool patents to collect royalties on already-developed drugs without ac-
tually facilitating the development of those drugs. In one instance, the University of Rochester
obtained, in 2000, a patent covering methods to assay drug candidates that inhibit the COX2 in-
flammation pathway. The university then sued the pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle, which
had launched a COX2 inhibitor, Celebrex, two years earlier in 1998 (35). During the litigation,
no licensee of the university’s invention who had been harmed by competition from Searle was
disclosed, nor had Searle needed the protection of the Rochester patent as an incentive or asset
to develop Celebrex. Rochester lost its case in 2003, and the patent was declared invalid (133). In
a similar instance, MIT licensed its NF-κB-inhibition screening patent exclusively to Ariad Phar-
maceuticals, which—with no product even under clinical trials at the time—then proceeded to sue
Eli Lilly and Company, the developer of two NF-κB-inhibitor drugs, Xigris and Evista (41, 107).
Ariad and MIT lost their case on validity grounds, including a complex statutory dispute (3). But
again, there was no evidence that MIT’s exclusive licensing regime furthered the development of
any particular product. Debates about universities’ enforcement of their patents against commer-
cial developers have become part of a larger debate about patent enforcement by nonpracticing
entities or so-called patent trolls (8, 76).
Of course, universities are not the only source of research tools. Commercial companies can be
quite aggressive with patents on research tools they come to control, frequently pursuing a winner-
takes-all strategy. One of the most infamous cases concerned Monsanto’s use of patents covering
Agrobacterium-mediated transformation of plants—a widely used research tool in crop research—
to assert broad dominance in the commercial development of genetically modified crops (99).
Agrobacterium is a complex technology, with variants for its use in different plant species (99).
But the core inventions resulted in a three-way patent dispute betweenWashington University in
St.Louis, theMax Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, andMonsanto (21).Monsanto’s
acquisition of additionalAgrobacterium-related patents through exclusive in-licensing and the pur-
chase of smaller agricultural biotechnology companies, such as Agracetus, Asgrow, Calgene, and
DeKalb, followed a strategy of combining protections over research tools, trait genes, and elite
breeding lines (49, 66). After this consolidation, Monsanto engaged in aggressive enforcement
against farmers (93) and declined to out-license the core research tools for use in crop species or
markets that it was not pursuing (50).
Complexity arising from multiple exclusive licenses—from different academic institutions—
has also proven problematic. This was the case with RNA interference (RNAi) technology, a tool
for suppressing gene expression that has enabled an entirely new class of therapeutics (56) and
crop traits (24). Beginning in 1998, key patents were filed by the Carnegie Institute ofWashington,
the University of Massachusetts, MIT, the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, and the
Max Planck Society (116). Overlapping ownership and licensing responsibilities were negotiated
in two interinstitutional agreements in 2001 and 2003. In between, one of the technology’s lead
inventors founded Alnylam Pharmaceuticals and took exclusive licenses to several of the core
RNAi inventions, with a strategy to aggregate and build on them for the development of human
therapeutics. In 2009, however, conflict over ownership and the management of these licenses
erupted in a lawsuit between the Max Planck Society, on one hand, and the Whitehead Institute,
MIT, and the University of Massachusetts, on the other (87). Alnylam joined the side of the Max
Planck Society, but the case was settled out of court,with the four academic institutions agreeing to





























































































common ownership and to exclusively licensing the patents in question to Alnylam (135). Alnylam
remains, to date, the only company successful in developing a therapeutic product licensed from
these original RNAi research-tool patents (57, 79).
Material Transfer Agreements
The advance of the life sciences has long involved the exchange of physical biological materials,
including whole organisms, reproductive materials (seed, sperm, and eggs), tissue samples, cell
lines, plasmids carrying key segments of DNA, and other components that embody the complex
biological systems being studied. Traditionally, academic laboratories, upon request from other
researchers, share these materials by shipping them to the requesting laboratory, and many view
such sharing as an inherent public service of the scientific community (15).
Over time, a range of banks, repositories, and biological resource centers emerged to help cu-
rate biological materials and fulfill such requests (109). The oldest still in existence may be the
seed banks of the US Department of Agriculture, some of which date back to 1897 (113). Cells
and tissues have similarly been deposited and disseminated by the American Type Culture Col-
lection since 1925 for scientific research purposes—and, due to a feature of patent law, as support
for patent filings (37 C.F.R. § 1.802). In fact, 47 similar depositories worldwide are currently rec-
ognized under the Budapest Treaty for microorganisms and other biological materials (144). The
Jackson Laboratory has, since it was established in 1929, specialized in mice as a model research
organism and has served as a leading animal repository for dissemination of laboratory mice (88).
And the Developmental Studies Hybridoma Bank was founded in 1986 at the University of Iowa
as a repository to curate and disseminate the hybridomas that produce monoclonal antibodies
(32). Such biological resource centers have long served as a means of preserving, curating, and
distributing research tools.
As academic institutions began to patent such research tools, the use of MTAs—essentially,
contracts—arose as a mechanism to formalize the legal terms of direct exchange of biological
research tools between institutions (15). To facilitate the management of these agreements, differ-
entiate them from commercial technology transfers, and minimize transaction costs, the NIH de-
veloped and published the Universal Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) in 1995.
The UBMTA, perhaps more than any other legal innovation, helped streamline the exchange of
research tools among research institutions funded by the NIH (38, 95). Among its many provi-
sions, the UBMTA stipulates general rules about how materials can be used, including the rule
that use be limited to nonprofit research institutions.TheUBMTA limits how and whenmaterials
can be transferred on to third parties and caps fees at the costs of providing the materials to the
recipient (15).
As the number of exchanges continued to proliferate, particularly forDNA plasmids, the fulfill-
ment of requests and the management of MTAs became a time-consuming and expensive propo-
sition for research laboratories focused on doing many things other than supplying plasmids. In
2004, researchers at MIT and Harvard established Addgene, an independent nonprofit repository
for DNA plasmids designed to solve this problem (59). It now ships well over 100,000 plasmids
each year to researchers all over the world, with each shipment accompanied by a standardized,
take-it-or-leave-it, electronic version of the UBMTA (69). In this sense, Addgene operates as a
centralized materials transfer, product curation, quality assurance, and shipping organization. In
addition to nonprofit repositories, as biological research has advanced, a range of commercial col-
lections, private collections, and commercial biobanks—including associated bioinformatic and
clinical or field data—have grown as well, competing in an increasingly market-like exchange of
materials and data between laboratories with ever-greater legal encumbrances (143).






























































































Although universities and science-funding agencies have sought to maintain the distinction be-
tween the dissemination of research tools for scientific pursuit and the commercial development of
product and process innovations, cases of research tools wholly unencumbered by patents are in-
creasingly rare. One prominent example, however, is that of the hybridoma technique for making
antibodies, pioneered byGeorges Köhler andCésarMilstein.About the same time that Cohen and
Boyer were patenting their technique for genetically engineering bacteria, Köhler andMilstein, at
the Medical Research Council Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, United Kingdom,
developed the hybridoma technique for producing antibodies, first published in 1975 (74). (They
received a Nobel Prize for their work in 1984; notably, Cohen and Boyer never received Nobel
recognition for their invention, although Paul Berg was recognized in 1989 for his work leading
to the field of recombinant DNA.) The National Research Development Corporation, which at
the time handled patenting of results from research supported by the British government, de-
clined to patent the hybridoma technique (80). As a result, the methods, together with the cell
lines necessary for the technique, were made readily available and diffused quickly throughout
the scientific community, some contemporaneous patents from others in the field notwithstand-
ing (130). A retrospective of this case concluded that the absence of patents on hybridoma cell
lines had a positive effect on research, both advancing the field of immunology and giving rise
to one of the earliest profitable sectors of the biotechnology industry: diagnostic and therapeutic
monoclonal antibodies (81).
The Emergence of Technology Transfer Norms
In response to the challenges of making complex decisions about the patenting and licensing of re-
search tools, funding agencies and technology transfer professionals began crafting formal guide-
lines for technology transfer practice. In 1999, the NIH published its sharing policy for research
tools as “Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Ob-
taining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources” (96); in 2005, the NIH published the
final draft of its “Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions” (97). And shortly there-
after, in 2007, the leadership of several university technology transfer offices convened to draw up
a set of guidelines titled “Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology,” which
dealt almost entirely with the challenges of licensing technologies with research-tool characteris-
tics. These guidelines were subsequently endorsed by the board of the Association of University
Technology Managers and more than 100 universities and research institutions (7). These docu-
ments draw lessons from the history of technology transfer for research tools and argue that each
technology is unique in content and context and that simple, absolute rules are therefore insuf-
ficient for assuring optimal outcomes in all cases (7, 96, 97). Even when an invention is useful
only as a research tool, there are multiple possibilities for how the technology could be developed
and, as a consequence, managed. When an invention is useful both as a research tool and as a
component of a downstream commercial product or process, these challenges are multiplied. The
remainder of this article explores the extent to which these lessons of history have been applied
in the commercialization of genome-editing technologies.
GENOME-EDITING TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR PATENT ESTATES
Genome-editing technologies first emerged in the late 1990s against this historical backdrop; to
date, they include meganucleases, ZFNs, TALENs, and CRISPR. While CRISPR has arguably
attracted the greatest public and scientific attention, the approaches that preceded it were also





























































































significant breakthroughs and were deployed for both research and therapeutic uses. To a large
extent, these genome-editing technologies were originally developed at universities and public
research institutions, which then patented and licensed them to industry.While we identify them
here as separate technologies, they utilize and build upon similar strategies of targeting restric-
tion endonucleases and are thus closely related to one another (83). University researchers have
also been responsible for creating—and patenting—vector technologies needed to transport these
various molecular genome-editing systems into living cells (121). We briefly review these tech-
nologies and their foundational patent estates.
Meganucleases
Meganucleases are naturally occurring large nucleases that possess a large DNA-binding
domain—sometimes spanning as many as 40 base pairs (128, 137).The size of these DNA-binding
segments means that any genomic sequence complement is likely to occur only once in a given
genome (23). In this sense, meganucleases are thought of as single-cut enzymes with minimal risk
of off-target cleavage (137). In the wild, there are hundreds of meganucleases, from a variety of
bacterial species (128). Given their specificity, however, they cannot be readily engineered to spe-
cific genomic sequences; their utility lies in their diversity and the ability to select from the wide
variety of naturally occurring options (128).
Meganucleases were the subject of a variety of patent applications when first discovered (26).
Duke University licensed its 2005 meganuclease inventions (125) exclusively to a faculty startup,
Precision BioSciences. A rival company, Cellectis, a 1999 startup from the Pasteur Institute, also
aimed to commercializemeganucleases, licensing patents from the Pasteur Institute and Pierre and
Marie Curie University (33). Cellectis continued to developed its meganuclease technology in-
house (4, 5). A patent dispute arose between Precision BioSciences and Cellectis in 2008 (18) that
was not resolved until 2014, when several of the original meganuclease patents were invalidated
and a cross-licensing agreement between the rivals was reached (77). With the advent of ZFNs
and TALENs, interest in meganucleases waned (94), a possible contributing factor leading to the
settlement.
Zinc Finger Nucleases
ZFNs are recombinant proteins, hybrids of zinc finger proteins—a broad class of transcription
factors utilizing zinc in their catalysis—and a restriction enzyme, typically Fok1 (134). Each zinc
finger protein used in ZFN engineering can recognize a different triplet nucleic acid sequence
(134). These proteins can then be linked together, allowing engineers to target relatively long
stretches of DNA—long enough, in many instances, to be unique to a specific site in the genome
(134). This system can be further designed to insert and modify DNA around the cleavage site
(134). ZFNs are not entirely modular, however, because there are often interacting effects among
individual zinc finger proteins that diminish their effectiveness and specificity (82, 137). Knowl-
edge of which combinations of zinc finger proteins can bind to which sequences—termed the zinc
finger rule set—has therefore been valuable in developing operable, recombinant ZFNs that are
unique to a single genomic site (117).
Like other genomic engineering technologies, ZFNs were developed first in academic labora-
tories, notably at MIT, Johns Hopkins, the California Institute of Technology, and Harvard (19).
While different aspects of the ZFN system were patented by universities, one company, Sang-
amo Biosciences, sought and successfully negotiated exclusive or field-specific exclusive patent
licenses to a large portion of the originating research institutions’ IP to commercially develop hu-
man therapies using ZFNs (19). These licenses added to Sangamo’s already large patent portfolio





























































































covering other aspects of the ZFN technology as well as a proprietary rule set (117). This
amounted Sangamo having “consolidated the majority of this patent estate” and exercising
“monopoly control over an important and versatile research platform” (19, p. 140). Sangamo is
now widely considered to have built an IP fortress in the area, including patents covering the
design, selection, and optimization of ZFNs (19). A ClinicalTrials.gov search shows that the com-
pany has initiated several clinical trials of ZFN-based therapies—for treating HIV as of 2009,
hemophilia and mucopolysaccharidosis as of 2016, and beta thalassemia as of 2019. Moreover,
Sangamo is the only company to have initiated clinical trials of ZFN-based therapies, even though
the technology has existed for more than 20 years.
Transcription Activator-Like Effector Nucleases
TALENs are another class of nucleases useful for genome engineering. TALENs are fusion pro-
teins consisting of two components: a DNA-binding domain, known as a TAL effector DNA-
binding domain, and a nuclease (25, 78). TAL effectors—proteins from the plant-infecting bacte-
rial genus Xanthomonas—have largely conserved amino acid sequences (12), with high variability
around two amino acids at positions 12 and 13 (12, 90, 115). These amino acids can be altered
to bind to a variety of DNA sequences in what has been described as “a simple cipher” (90).
TALENs can then be linked together modularly—more easily than ZFNs—to recognize and
cleave a specific site in a genome (137). With the addition of exogenous DNA, engineers can
then rely on endogenous cellular repair mechanisms to edit the genome (137).
TALENs were originally developed by researchers at Iowa State University, the University
of Minnesota, and Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg in Germany (12, 25, 78, 90,
115). Like their sister genome-editing technologies, fundamental uses of TALENs were patented
by these institutions (13, 138). The patents issued to Iowa State and the University of Minnesota
were licensed exclusively to Cellectis and its US subsidiary, Calyxt, a startup founded by the inven-
tors at Iowa State and the University of Minnesota (115). The patents granted to Martin Luther
University were licensed (in agriculture, at least) exclusively to a US nonprofit organization, the
2Blades Foundation (115). The foundation has been dedicated to widely dispersing TALENs for
agricultural applications, centered largely on its long-standing sublicensing efforts for agricul-
tural commercial applications, included licenses to Calyxt (115). To date, Cellectis and Calyxt
have maintained arguably the preeminent patent position for TALENs, for both agriculture and
human therapeutics (10, 26, 115).
CRISPR
CRISPR is the newest genome-editing technology and has a wide variety of applications, from
precise genome editing to sensitive detection of specific nucleic acid sequences for diagnostic
purposes (9, 46, 62). Its most heralded application, though, is likely genome editing for therapeutic
purposes.This system’smost basic form requires only two components: a type II CRISPR nuclease
(with Cas9 being the most well understood) and a single guide RNA—a short piece of RNA that
both activates the CRISPR nuclease and directs the enzyme to a complementary portion of the
DNA in the genome to cleave (27, 42, 67).
The patent estate for CRISPR/Cas9 has been controlled primarily by two research institutions:
the Broad Institute, stemming from work done by Feng Zhang, and the University of California,
stemming from work done by Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier (affiliated with the
University of Umeå, in Sweden, at the time of her contribution) (28, 34). In addition, Virginijus
Šikšnys (Vilnius University, Lithuania) was a substantial contributor to the core technology and
filed some of the earliest patents on CRISPR/Cas9 (123). A complex set of licenses, sublicenses,





























































































and cross-licenses as well as surrogate licensing companies—some of which have begun clinical
trials—define the patent landscape of CRISPR/Cas9 (28). The situation has been made yet more
complicated by an ongoing dispute over the scope of the foundational patents and thus the tech-
nology’s ownership in both the United States and Europe (39, 119).
Since the foundational patents were filed, several other entities have also obtained patent pro-
tection on various aspects of CRISPR, including the research-tool companies Sigma-Aldrich and
ToolGen (22, 73). The landscape of patents and patent applications—from both universities and
the private sector—has continued to increase throughout the world as the applications of CRISPR
have continued to diversify (34).
Genome-Editing Vectors
Genome editing’s promise cannot be realized without vectors to insert the genome-editing ma-
chinery into and express it within living cells (60, 141, 145). There are an almost endless variety of
genome-editing vectors, including physical insertionmechanisms, viral vectors, and even synthetic
nanoparticles (121). Recent successes in human gene therapy have demonstrated the importance
of improvements in vector technology. Spark Therapeutics (now owned byHoffmann–La Roche),
for example, developed an adeno-associated virus vector for ocular delivery of an episome cod-
ing for RPE65, the absence of which causes degenerative blindness in childhood. Spark’s product,
Luxturna, was recently approved by the US Food and Drug Administration after a long history of
failures for other viral vectors (108).
The diversity of vectors for genome editing is characterized by a significant patent landscape,
including methods of using and manufacturing them (34, 121). Some—such as ex vivo T cell
modifications—were developed by universities and subsequently licensed to commercial develop-
ers (121). Others—such as Spark’s adeno-associated virus technology—were developed mainly in
the private sector (108). In addition, patents concerning vectors’ use and manufacturing are also
held by a range of parties, complicating development and licensing (121). These patents do not
pertain to genome editing per se; however, given that they are necessary to developmany genome-
editing products, they represent a strategically important area within the overall IP landscape.
CURRENT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MODELS
FOR GENOME EDITING
A range of models have been employed to manage the transfer of genome-editing technologies
from research institutions to subsequent users. These include IP-free models that place such tech-
nologies in the public domain; open access models supported by MTAs; nonexclusive IP licenses
for downstream tool or kit uses; nonexclusive licenses for products, the distribution of which is
humanitarian in nature; aggregated nonexclusive licenses; field-of-use licenses; and exclusive li-
censes to surrogates. We also discuss IP licenses through auctions and clearinghouses—models
that have received significant scholarly interest but little purchase among IP holders (65, 84).
Despite the diversity in models, several key factors broadly characterize the relative degree of
restriction or openness. First, the number of rights holders over mutually interdependent or com-
plementary parts of a given genome-editing technology determines how fractured the technology
patent estate is for that technology. Consequently, this factor can be used to assess how endemic
the problem of the anticommons is for that technology—that is, how much aggregation of sepa-
rate permissions is necessary for a user to arrive at reasonable freedom to operate, and at what cost
(58). While claims of anticommons in biomedical research have produced more smoke than fire,
the fractured patent estates for genome-editing technologies should nonetheless instill caution.





























































































Second, exclusivity is a spectrum, not a binary choice. The number of users who are ultimately
licensed defines the extent to which a licensing model is exclusive or nonexclusive: More users
with licenses means that those tools are less exclusive; conversely, fewer users with licenses means
that the tools are more exclusive.
Third, segmentation is a function of not merely how many users have access to a genome-
editing research tool, but also which uses are permissible for each user. Delimitations of the terms
of a license to a specific type of use, a specific market, or even a specific target, such as a single
gene or therapeutic, create the segmentation or differentiation of a licensing model. In this sense,
licensing can be quite exclusive for some uses of a patent but quite nonexclusive for other uses (28).
Finally, licensing models can be further characterized by their degree of directness. Licenses
can span a range from direct, tomediated, to indirect.The nature of these transactions is ultimately
a result of the extent to which the original assignee has entrusted or outsourced to third parties
the responsibility (and the benefits) of licensing management.
Whether these models will continue to diversify or winnow down to a simpler set of options
remains to be seen. The diversity of models now being employed (or proposed) may be attributed
to the complexity of genome-editing technologies, the plethora of possible applications, the legal
uncertainty from ongoing disputes and inconsistencies among jurisdictions, or some combination
of these factors. The diversity certainly arises from the endemic challenges of the technology’s
dual nature, being both a powerful research tool and an essential component of downstream com-
mercial products. This diversity in models may also be considered simply as a natural progression
of the sophistication of licensing regimes in a maturing knowledge economy. Time—and the pro-
gression of the technology under such licensing regimes—will tell.
The Public Domain
The norms of open science have long prevented secrecy or claims of IP, largely due to the incen-
tives and pressures that exist to publish new discoveries in a way that enables others to validate
and corroborate the veracity of those discoveries (31). Today, university scientists (or at least their
technology transfer offices) understand that if, in the rush to claim scientific priority, an idea is
published, it may no longer be considered novel under patent law (118), effectively depositing
it in the public domain. Some have advocated for intentional strategies of defensive publication
to secure technologies in the public domain for wider use and application (11, 14). Similarly, as
patents expire, the inventions they protected revert to the public domain for anyone to use (11).
Practically speaking, a vast body of knowledge resides in the public domain. Analogously,many bi-
ological materials are freely accessible from public repositories and banks, and enormous amounts
of data are available from public databases (15).
Such intellectual resources have provided the foundation for advances in genome editing (119).
Yet the public domain is vulnerable to expropriation or enclosure, especially along the frontiers
in rapidly growing fields like genome editing. One recent notable experiment in using the pub-
lic domain explicitly in order to encourage commercialization is the Open Science initiative at
the Montreal Neurological Institute, which consists of an institution-wide commitment to open
access publication and free provision of data, software, and materials (105). The initiative also
includes a promise to refrain from filing of patents in favor of alternative, open commercializa-
tion strategies (105). With respect to genome editing, the initiative includes a program to make
CRISPR-knockout neuronal cell lines derived from induced pluripotent stem cells and all the pro-
tocols involved freely available (105). But these efforts center on specific applications of genome
editing. By contrast, to date, none of the core inventions of genome editing have been left in the
public domain.





























































































Maintaining Open Access with Contracts and Material Transfer Agreements
A growing number of initiatives in biotechnology, many of which involve CRISPR or other
genome-editing technologies, have devised openness-preserving strategies using contractual
mechanisms. Addgene has become the primary source for exchange of plasmids containing ZFN,
TALEN, and CRISPR components, distributing them broadly to researchers under the terms of
the UBMTA, with highly efficient options for electronic MTA approval and even automated ap-
proval under established institutional accounts (69).While this model has been highly effective in
advancing research, one of the main challenges has been the blanket restriction against commer-
cial users, inherited from the UBMTA, which some have argued disproportionately disadvantages
small startup companies from academic institutions and thus generally hampers commercialization
(68). To that end, the BioBricks Foundation has helped develop a new standardized MTA that it
terms the OpenMTA. In contrast to the UBMTA, the OpenMTA removes restrictions on further
transfer to third parties, including transfer to commercial users, in particular small biotechnology
startup companies that originate from university research laboratories (68). Despite this seeming
appeal, the new OpenMTA has yet to be implemented.
Apart from MTAs, the BioBricks Foundation has also developed an open model for the syn-
thetic biology research community through the BioBrick Public Agreement, essentially an IP
nonassertion user agreement for accessing and sharing standardized molecular biology compo-
nents. Like the OpenMTA, the nonassertion provisions apply to both commercial entities and
academics (52).
The global network of influenza virus researchers and vaccine companies, under the auspices of
the World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS),
have devised a novel two-tiered system of agreements designed to formalize and preserve the
sharing practices that had originated within that scientific community. These agreements directly
serve a commercial end: the seasonal development of commercial flu vaccines (70). However, the
flu network’s IP model does not appear to have been replicated in other research communities or
for other technologies to date.
Nonexclusive Licensing for Research Kits and Reagents
An entire category of licenses for commercializing the core CRISPR inventions was offered
nonexclusively to a range of companies that specialize in selling research equipment and stan-
dardized reagents, including Sigma-Aldrich, GEHealthcare, Takara Bio (formerly Clontech Lab-
oratories), Horizon, and others (28). These companies sell CRISPR products for use in research
laboratories, including both academic and commercial research and development. However, the
terms of use by those who purchase these CRISPR products are typically quite restrictive. For
example, the Sigma-Aldrich end user agreement forbids any clinical or commercial uses, includ-
ing in human or veterinary diagnostics or therapeutics or in commercial crop applications (122).
This effectively results in a two-tiered strategy of nonexclusive licensing upstream, even for com-
mercially oriented research, followed by potentially more restrictive intermediate or downstream
licensing that would need to be separately negotiated for any commercial product developed under
the research license.
Nonexclusive Licensing for Humanitarian Uses
Similarly, a category of licenses to the core CRISPR inventions has been offered to nonprofit
research organizations, particularly in agriculture, that are dedicated to creating technologies for
use in developing countries. For example, both the International Maize andWheat Improvement
Center and the International Rice Research Institute have received licenses from the Broad





























































































Institute and Corteva Agriscience (formerly DuPont Pioneer and Dow AgroSciences) for breed-
ing of crops to be used in smallholder agriculture (64, 89). Here, too, whether such a licensing
model will extend beyond smallholder agriculture remains to be seen, but it could very well be
employed for clear and direct humanitarian efforts in therapeutic and preventative medical uses
of genome editing (e.g., for infectious tropical diseases).
Aggregated Nonexclusive Licensing
Another particularly interesting model, given the number of overlapping and competing rights
holders, is the aggregated license (55)—a suite of IP rights from multiple owners made available
to multiple users. In engineering and information technology, patent pools have long been used
to aggregate multiple complementary patents over general-purpose or standardized technologies
held by multiple owners for licensing to many users (such as the 4G telecommunications stan-
dard). In biotechnology, collective models have recently been proposed to solve similar problems
for genome editing (102, 136). In CRISPR, an aggregation of multiple source licenses has been
achieved at least within one particular field of use—certain crop plants—through a complex series
of licensing arrangements among research institutions and commercial developers (17). This was
announced in 2017 as an effort of the Broad Institute and Corteva Agriscience, resulting in a joint
licensing framework that brings together patents that both parties had come to control through
management agreements, exclusive licenses, cross-licenses, and other means, representing at least
a dozen different owners and including all of the core patents over the main CRISPR inventions
from the University of California, Berkeley; Vilnius University; and MIT and the Broad Institute
(17). This joint licensing framework offers nonexclusive commercial licenses to any and all inter-
ested users of CRISPR in crop agriculture, including direct competitors of Corteva in its major
markets.While demand for licenses from such frameworks has been low, interest from developers
in the field is gaining, and the agreement may serve as a proof of concept for future efforts.
Field-of-Use Exclusive Licenses
One of the main instruments of patent commercialization by universities has long been the exclu-
sive license, whereby a single commercial entity receives all rights to use a patented technology
(77). From the perspective of entrepreneurs and investors, such exclusivity is often essential.How-
ever, in the case of very broad research tools, like genome editing, no single company can possibly
exploit all possible commercial applications of the technology; exclusivity beyond that which can
be utilized, necessary or not, is simple waste (8). For this reason, exclusivity is discouraged by a
number of public organizations and agencies, including, perhaps most famously, the NIH, whose
licensing guidelines discourage the practice (96). In such cases, exclusivity can be narrowed to a
single market or field of use in which a licensee has interest, expertise, and capacity, an approach
that has been partially used for CRISPR/Cas9 (28). Such field-of-use exclusive licensing is little
different from exclusive licensing models for single genes or therapeutic products. Given the in-
crease in maturity in these models, there is hope that technology managers can police some of
their worst excesses; the recent and rapid initiation of clinical trials based on CRISPR by three
different companies provides some hope in that regard.
Exclusive Surrogate Licensing
Exclusive licensing need not be direct; an interesting commercialization model has emerged in
recent decades involving faculty startups that take exclusive licenses to a faculty member’s in-
vention, which are then responsible for both commercializing and sublicensing the invention to





























































































others (28). This approach builds on the historic model of third-party patent management of
university inventions, as pioneered by the Research Corporation in the early twentieth century,
discussed above (91), but with the addition of commercial development by the licensing agent
itself. A recent precedent was Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, which was founded by one of the lead
inventors in the field of RNAi and which not only offers sublicenses to its RNAi portfolio but
also actively develops RNAi-based therapies. Inventors’ startup companies have been involved in
other genome-editing technologies, including Precision BioSciences (founded at Duke Univer-
sity) in meganucleases and Calyxt (founded at the University ofMinnesota) in TALENS, although
neither of these companies took a significant role in sublicensing.
By contrast, the surrogate licensing model has been vigorously pursued in the case of CRISPR/
Cas9 (28), with Caribou Biosciences (and its human therapeutics sublicensee, Intellia Therapeu-
tics) founded by Jennifer Doudna at the University of California, ERS Genomics and CRISPR
Therapeutics founded by Emmanuelle Charpentier, and Editas Medicine founded by Feng Zhang
at MIT and the Broad Institute. In each of these cases, the startup surrogate received an exclusive
license to the fundamental technology, with a charge to sublicense the technology to others. Like
exclusive licenses, generally, this surrogate licensing model faces some significant inefficiencies,
some of which are putatively policed by the originating universities’ rights to “claw back” their
rights to the technology if it remains underdeveloped by the surrogate. But underdevelopment is
difficult to prove (28).
Other Potential Models: Auctions and Clearinghouses
There are other potential models of interest to scholars and policy makers that have not yet
been exercised in commercializing genome-editing technologies. Among these are patent auc-
tions and the related models of clearinghouses or exchanges (8, 84, 102), which have several po-
tential benefits over traditional licensing models, particularly a more efficient price discovery pro-
cess. But they also have several drawbacks. First among these is that, thus far, patent auctions
have facilitated sales transactions, not merely licenses; thus, only patent owners with technologies
amenable to outright sale have been interested (65). (However, the question of whether auctions
could be extended to at least some types of licensing contracts is worthy of investigation.) Second,
true patent auctions have been held infrequently, and the uneven timing of transactions may not
fit the rapidly evolving and fast-paced research and development demands of most companies
engaged in genome editing.
Online patent exchanges or clearinghouses were avidly pursued by a range of players in the
1990s and early 2000s and promised easier market discovery and greater flexibility of different
types of transactions (51). Both auctions and online exchanges, it turns out, can suffer from thin
markets and are often unable to offer comprehensive solutions for potential buyers or licensees.
Still, as online applications and exchange technologies advance, there may be room for innovation
by IP aggregators or hybrid auction-based exchanges, auctioning of standardized licenses, and
auctioning in continuous time. If these facilitate greater market liquidity and flexible matching
between supply and demand, such models may become viable for biotechnology (55, 84).
IMPLICATIONS OF GENOME EDITING’S PATENT ESTATES
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MODELS
The current diversity in patent estates and technology transfer models provides some insight
into what the future may look like. First, there are likely to be an increasing number of entities
patenting not only new genome-editing technologies but also new uses and applications of





























































































existing genome-editing technologies. This is demonstrated by the rapidly expanding and diver-
sifying patent landscape for CRISPR, which includes patents covering new engineered nucleases,
improvements on older versions of the technology, and new applications for existing components
(34). A significant portion of new technology will still come from academia, as has been the case
with CRISPR thus far. The success of CRISPR and its variants has encouraged a significant
amount of academic research, and patenting of new results by academic institutions will continue.
Increased patenting of forthcoming genome-editing technologies may mean that smaller uni-
versities (with tighter budgets, lower research expenditures, and smaller endowments) as well as
small venture-capital-backed biotechnology companies will have even stronger incentives to hold
out for more stringently enforced and more costly exclusive licenses. For CRISPR, at least, these
concerns have been somewhat ameliorated by the financial footing of and competition between
the Broad Institute and theUniversity of California—two of themost well-financed research insti-
tutions in the world. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that the CRISPR patent dispute between
these parties has stymied academic research, although this seems significantly due to the work
of Addgene. And it appears that commercial development of the technology is proceeding at a
fast clip even with little certainty of freedom to operate downstream. But this will not necessarily
remain the case in the longer run.
At the same time, the more that genome editing diversifies, the more its constituent tech-
nologies are likely to diverge rather than interfere and compete with one another. For example,
discoveries of new nucleases beyond Cas9 fall outside of the principal patent dispute. More types
of genome-editing technologies, especially where they are interchangeable for certain applica-
tions, may serve to operate as competing tools (94). In addition, the future of genome-editing
technologies is likely to include newer platforms on which developers can build, such as the
Broad Institute’s prime editing system (1). Rapid development of variants of a genome-editing
technology may build a robust marketplace for different uses—and competition for patent
licenses. This may ultimately counsel against exclusive licensing or, even where exclusive licenses
are pursued, may lead to exclusive licenses essentially competing against one another on terms
such as price. Still, dominant patents covering foundational aspects of an original technology may
complicate such competition by establishing themselves—by virtue of the patent laws—as neces-
sary components to practice new yet subordinate downstream applications. The ultimate power
of any technology platform lies both in its ability to develop a robust competitive marketplace
for licenses and in its potential to be optimized for different types of applications.
The Advantages of Diversity
All else being equal, the diversity of models for technology transfer in genome editing is a good
thing. It allows for more flexible licensing approaches, which can result in greater competition
and innovation (28). It allows institutions to experiment with licensing—to see what works and,
where it does not, to improve. It also allows research institutions to mimic approaches that have
been successful elsewhere. We think of this as a federalism model of technology transfer, a ref-
erence to the way that individual states within a federal system can experiment with different
state-level policies and legal approaches in response to their unique circumstances (98). Further-
more, this diversity in models allows customization and optimization depending on the specifics
of the technology and its application; for example, the take-it-or-leave-it conditions built into the
UBMTA spurred the introduction of the OpenMTA as a more adaptive and flexible approach
(68).
At the same time, a diversity in licensing approaches may serve as an apologia for harmful
licensing practices. A greater diversity of licensing models, especially for those trafficking in





























































































exclusivity,may encouragemore entities to use exclusivity thanwould have otherwise,whichwould
risk locking up genome-editing technologies.On balance, however,we view diversity as promoting
experimentation, given the historical default toward exclusivity. Current licensing experiments re-
garding CRISPR/Cas9 seem to already be an improvement over older models of pure exclusivity,
as seen in RNAi or even ZFNs.We encourage technology managers to continue to experiment.
Technological Pace
An important consideration of patent licensing for genome editing is the speed of development
of the technology itself. It stands to reason that when a technology is rapidly advancing, the im-
portance of any given patent estate is potentially limited: Users will likely soon have alternatives,
and the benefits of controlling a particular technological platform will wane. For example, the
emergence of induced pluripotent stem cells appears to have fundamentally shifted the licensing
landscape of human embryonic stem cells (86). For genome editing, the number of CRISPR li-
censors is likely to increase, thus increasing competition. The advance of CRISPR, coupled with
its diffusion and democratization, may prove to be the ultimate example of these dynamics.
For future genome-editing technologies, the rapid pace of development has several implica-
tions. First, the particular licensing practices of any given institution may not matter all that much
in the end. If one institution adopts a restrictive, exclusive license for its variant of the technol-
ogy, others will likely be encouraged to adopt more liberal licensing policies for their variants as
competitive measures.
Second, even artful patent drafting—writing patents to cover the broadest scope of the un-
derlying invention—will be unable to keep pace with the cutting edge of the technology itself.
Barring a few idiosyncratic circumstances, patent applicants cannot claim advances to their in-
ventions that they neither foresaw nor possessed at the time of their invention. This means that
it is unlikely that initial broad discoveries in the genome-editing space will result in patents that
can be wielded to halt iterative development of the genome-editing technology unforeseen—and
undisclosed—by the original inventors.
Third, the global interest in the technology will result inmore institutions frommore countries
filing for patents covering their developments outside the first jurisdiction in which they were
discovered. This has the potential to lead to global—and conflicting—patent disputes, as is the
case with CRISPR/Cas9 in Europe (39), which may ultimately serve to compel settlement, if not
cross-licensing.
In sum, the new enzymes for CRISPR, advances for TALENs, and the current riot of meganu-
cleases all suggest that new techniques for genome editing are routinely introduced and frequently
evade attempts of initial inventors to grasp large applications of the technology upon first no-
tice. Much like other areas of licensing, the diversity of models of licensing for genome editing
demonstrates that technical substitutes may serve as economic substitutes, too, be it in terms of
components, licensing terms, or even licensors.
The Rise of Third-Party Licensing Intermediaries
A final interesting implication of genome editing’s technology transfer models is the increasing
importance of third-party intermediaries, such as Addgene and the 2Blades Foundation. Before
the development of genome editing, patents covering broad uses of platform technology were
managed almost entirely by the institutions that developed them and their exclusive licensees.
In contravention of universities’ broader missions to disseminate the fruits of their research to
the public, this approach aligned licensees’ profit motives with their universities, in some cases





























































































potentially delaying the commercial development of the underlying technology (35). But
off-loading nonexclusive licensing or material transfers to third parties allows some separa-
tion between commercial licensees’ profit motives and universities’ obligations to disseminate
technologies developed at their laboratories as widely as possible.
This model, in some areas, has been a clear success. Nonprofit academic researchers have
simple, easy access to genome-editing materials and permission to use them without needing
to go through technology transfer offices or other researchers’ (busy) laboratory staff. Addgene
employs, instead, a professional staff invested in quality control, documentation, and customer
support, unheard of for more informal transfers of biological materials among academic re-
searchers. In addition, third-party intermediaries’ boilerplate, take-it-or-leave-it licensing terms
cut down—or eliminate, in many instances—the cost of negotiating agreements for materials
or reagents. In the case of 2Blades, this extends to commercial developers as well. Technology
transfer policies centered on separating academic from commercial licensing without the cost of
maintenance, or even nonexclusive licenses for commercial applications, could see third-party
intermediaries play a greater role in the future.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this article, we have presented a review of current genome-editing technologies, the variety of
models used to mediate technology transfer, and the implications of their development. Several
avenues remain for future research in this area to add empirical rigor to some of the generalizations
and predictions made here.
First, additional landscapingwork for each of the genome-editing technologies described above
is needed—and will continue to be on an ongoing basis—given the rapid development of the field.
It is of significant interest to many to know which institutions are seeking patent protection on
their new technology variants, how those variants differ from prior variants, and to whom such
patents are being licensed. More detailed work should also examine the breadth of the claims
being prosecuted and the specific terms of the licenses being employed.Even narrow licenses from
multiple institutions may nonetheless result in a patent-mediated monopoly for a technology, as
seems to have been the case with Sangamo and ZFNs (19). Keeping an eye on such developments
would be useful to technology transfer professionals and researchers alike.
Second, research into the funding sources underlying the development of competing tech-
nologies would also prove fruitful. Much of the work on technology transfer for genome editing
presumes, in large part, that universities and research institutions receive funding almost entirely,
in a sense, agnostically through grants; that the stochastic results of such grant-funded research
can be patented; and that those patents are subsequently licensed as a means of increasing the
potential for commercial uptake. But this assumption discounts or ignores the role that public–
private partnerships may play in targeting the development of a technology or, as with genome
editing, the role that commercial developers may play in making basic discoveries about the tech-
nology themselves. In fact, some of the original research into the mechanisms behind CRISPR,
as a bacterial adaptive immune system, was conducted by commercial interests, with the applied
engineering work then performed in academic settings (119). Thus, even the leading example of
genome-editing technology challenges typical assumptions about the archetypal linear model of
innovation.
Third, additional exploration into the feasibility of auctions for licenses would be opportune.
Recent academic work suggests that auctions for patent licenses could partially alleviate the ten-
sion between exclusivity and commercial development present for university technology transfer
policies (8). Whether such a mechanism would be feasible for field-delimited or nonexclusive





























































































licenses to genome editing—facilitated by online connections and algorithms—within a clearing-
house model is worthy of further investigation (129).
Fourth, continued investigation into the successes or failures of IP-free models for genome
editing, such as those recently announced by the Montreal Neurology Institute or the BioBricks
Foundation, is important (70, 105). Much of the work here presumes that universities will con-
tinue to patent their inventions, regardless of the licensing model eventually employed. But this
decision is not inexorable, and any demonstration that IP-free models for genome editing both
are revenue positive for universities and result in commercial development would be an impor-
tant development. Recent work on the IP-free nature of the GISRS flu network suggests that such
a model is at least possible (70). Whether these are isolated cases or a broader statement about
technology transfer remains unclear.
Ultimately, both genome-editing technologies and technology transfer practices havematured.
Today, the technology is rapidly diversifying and increasing in power, prestige, and potential. Ef-
fectively directing such power for commercial innovation clearly has not simply meant increasing
the use of exclusive licensing; the success of third-party intermediaries in reducing friction in
research use and encouraging investment in startups has shown otherwise. Rather, understand-
ing genome-editing technologies and models of technology transfer as interacting within a larger
system replete with competition and experimentation should counsel technology managers, pol-
icy scholars, and scientists alike to continue to forge new paths toward fulfilling the promise of
genome editing.
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